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CUBAN CRISIS TS-185142 19 Nov 1962

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DDR memo to DCI Subj: Revised Lehman Paper, 15 Nov 1962

Paper re Agency's part in Cuban activities Oct 1962.

- a) Para 56. May¹² somewhat misleading. I have not found any record in COMOR of the San Cristobal area as a target until 3 Oct.
- b) para 57. Some of the delay (4 to 9 October) resulted from the SG request to DNRO to prepare an over-all Cuban recon program including vulnerability studies on U-2 vs. SAM sites in Cuba.
- c) Para 62. I believe USIB considered the COMOR paper on 10 Oct after the SG meeting, not before on 6 October.

/s/ H.S., Jr.

TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD
PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE OF CUBA

1. The intelligence needs of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council with respect to Cuba have been noted by the United States Intelligence Board. A reasonable program for photographic reconnaissance of Cuba calls for high-level coverage of approximately twenty high-priority targets once a week and surveillance of all priority targets at least twice a month.

2. Low-level photography will be needed when high-level photography or other intelligence sources reveal ominous or suspicious activity that cannot be fully assessed without larger-scale photography, or when weather or other factors preclude high-level coverage of the high-priority targets at least every week. In addition, low-level missions should be flown if it is impossible to secure adequate high-level photography reasonably soon after the arrival of large hatch freighters in a Cuban port and in the absence of other satisfactory intelligence.

Approved by the United States Intelligence Board, 5 December 1962

TS 185148/A

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